



# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## BRITISH POST-WAR OUTLOOK CLOUDED BY FEAR OF UNEMPLOYMENT

IN Britain, as in this country, there is general optimism regarding the military situation in Europe. This feeling is tempered, it is true, by disappointment with the slow progress of the Allied armies in Italy, and by frustration at the absence of the Second Front, but Russian victories in the great bend of the Dnieper outweigh all other considerations in the military field. To a much greater extent than in the United States, however, optimism in Britain is combined with widespread apprehension about the post-war period.

**FEAR OF POST-WAR UNEMPLOYMENT.** Although apprehension about international reconstruction exists and serious concern is felt at the failure of Allied statesmen to formulate a declaration as stirring as President Wilson's Fourteen Points, fear goes much deeper with respect to domestic problems. No one expects the spiritual revival predicted at the time of the Blitz to materialize, and hopes that the "service" rather than the profit motive would provide a "just" economic system have disappeared.

Many, whose views of the future are inevitably based on memories of the past, cannot forget the unemployment and poverty of the inter-war years. Prime Minister Churchill's Four-Year Plan has not convinced the people that the government is prepared to take the action necessary to avoid repetition of pre-war conditions. Notwithstanding the Beveridge Plan for social security, and various schemes for land reform, educational reform, and reconstruction of bombed areas, many feel that the government has no general program that will provide full employment and a rising standard of living for the average man. Although the British government has gone further than the American government in mapping out post-war reforms, there is greater dissatisfaction in Britain than in the United States with what has been done.

Possibly, as Mr. Gallup points out, the demand for reform in democratic countries moves in cycles and the British are in a mood for reform while the Ameri-

cans are not. But a more likely explanation might be found in these three factors: 1. There has been in Britain no war boom comparable with that in the United States to make the people forget pre-war conditions. 2. The British nation, now in its fifth year of war, is suffering physical fatigue, which tends to induce pessimism. 3. Whereas the majority of Americans expect post-war prosperity within the framework of private enterprise, reform to a large body of the British public would mean more, not less, government control of business than in the pre-war years. This belief in government control is undoubtedly heightened by admiration of the military power and moral unity of the Russians during the war, just as the victory of American democracy over the slave system strengthened democratic forces in Britain before the Reform Bill of 1867.

**MORE GOVERNMENT CONTROL EXPECTED.** Belief in greater government participation in economic affairs is not limited to workers and intellectuals, or to the Labor party. It is held by many businessmen and Conservative party members. Indeed, despite individual differences between groups such as miners, farmers and businessmen—perhaps as great as those between similar groups in the United States—there is a wide measure of agreement that the government must exercise general supervision over large areas of economic activity, including regulation of industry, use of the land, and distribution of commodities. This does not mean that workers or businessmen contemplate any such concentration of power as that in the Soviet system or that either group is prepared to give up political liberties in moving in the direction of greater state control of economic life. What it does mean is that representatives of both capital and labor are prepared to see economic questions settled to a larger extent within the administrative process and to a lesser extent by pressure groups in Parliament.

What causes apprehension in Britain is that so little has been done to make the post-war pattern clear. There is disappointment that more specific promises have not been made with respect to the Beveridge Plan, and that no Ministry of Social Security has been established to put the scheme into effect. The Welsh miners and the Clydeside workers would like to know how the government plans to maintain full employment in the mines and the shipyards after the war, and are skeptical of the Labor party as well as the Conservatives. Some circles of the intellectual Left fear that Labor members of the Churchill government have already sold out to the Conservatives, as they feel Ramsay MacDonald did in 1931, and that the only possible result is a corporate state in which trade unions will share the spoils with big business.

**CORPORATE STATE UNLIKELY.** This fear hardly seems justified, and there is good reason to believe that, when the war is ended, such men as Herbert Morrison and Ernest Bevin will lead the Labor party into active opposition. In doing, their program would differ from the Conservative more in degree than in kind. A Labor government would be more likely to give full effect to the proposals of the Beveridge Plan, to nationalize an industry like mining, and to abandon financial orthodoxy. But, in es-

tablishing greater peacetime controls over economic activity, Labor would be limited by opposition to excessive interference in the daily lives of the British people, and by the need to maintain Britain's economic position in the world. Internal reforms which might weaken that position would not attract a Labor any more than a Conservative government.

On the other hand, the Conservative party may be expected to keep in step with public opinion, although following rather than leading it. A Conservative government would not hesitate to maintain controls to strengthen the domestic economy or to promote British foreign trade. But the corporate state, however attractive to a few reactionary elements, is no more in the Conservative than in the Labor tradition, and certainly not in line with the political and social development of modern Britain. As a result of the war—and the lessons learned regarding the advantages and disadvantages of rationing, price control, and general supervision of economic activity—as well as the present temper of the British people, it can be expected that Britain will enter the post-war period with more government control of economic life than the United States.

HOWARD P. WHIDDEN, JR.

## COMMON ALLIED POLICY NEEDED TO AVERT CIVIL STRIFE IN GREECE

At the three-power Moscow conference, which opened on October 19, the political complexion of the post-war governments that will emerge in Europe's liberated nations is undoubtedly an important issue. As observers of the enemy-occupied countries have frequently pointed out, any attempts to restore discredited institutions and leaders may be expected to encounter strong resistance and add months of civil strife to the war against Nazism. During recent weeks, specific warnings along this line have been sounded in the case of Yugoslavia, and similar admonitions are now being made in connection with Greece as a result of a *New York Times* dispatch from Cairo on October 17, which reported a clash between two Greek guerrilla organizations in the central portion of the country on October 9.

**DANGER OF CIVIL WAR.** The present situation in Greece is far from clear, for American friends of the Greek guerrillas discredit the report of civil war as propaganda fabricated by the Greek King in Cairo to picture a badly rent nation in need of his efforts to restore unity. They insist that the King's only hope of returning to Greece after the Nazis are forced out lies in dividing the strong opposition to him at home, and they also intimate that he relies on Anglo-American support for carrying out his unpopular policy. In defense of the contention that the guerrillas are united, these sources point to an official announcement from London on October 15 that Greek patriots

fought a heavy engagement with the Nazis in the location where civil war is reported to have broken out a week earlier. Moreover, they declare that the guerrilla organizations have frequently demonstrated their unity—most notably on August 10, when they sent a joint delegation to Cairo to confer with Allied military authorities and to express their opposition to the return of the King until a plebiscite is held to determine whether post-war Greece should be a monarchy or a republic. Confirmation of either version of events in Greece is lacking because of heavy censorship in the eastern Mediterranean area.

All observers agree, however, that whether or not civil war is now raging, there are in Greece the germs of post-war struggle which might endanger the reconstruction of the nation and seriously impair relations between the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States. Among the movements which might be expected to oppose the restoration of any vestige of the pre-war dictatorship established by the King and Premier Metaxas in 1936 is the Popular Liberation Front, the largest and most powerful of the guerrilla groups. Its political views are known to be definitely Leftist, and its membership includes many Greek Communists. Two other important guerrilla organizations, the Greek National Democratic Army and the National and Social Liberation Group, are liberal rather than radical in their outlook but nevertheless unalterably oppose reestablishment of the pre-war

régime. On the other hand, the King and his supporters in Cairo and in the Royal Greek Army of the Near East want popular elections to be held after, rather than before, their return to Greece.

**RUSSIA AND SECURITY.** Against this background of potential discord the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States are called upon to formulate their policies toward a liberated Greece. Moscow's chief interest in this Balkan nation, as in its neighbors, is security, and the Soviet government therefore wants a régime in Athens friendly to the U.S.S.R. That the Kremlin will not tolerate the establishment of a government or bloc hostile to the Soviets has already been indicated by Russian opposition to the plans for federation proposed by the Yugoslav and Greek governments-in-exile in January 1942. At the same time, Soviet attempts to secure a friendly post-war Greece are being aided by the increasing popularity and prestige of the Red Army.

Another step in the direction of closer Soviet-Greek relations was taken this summer, when Moscow changed its official attitude toward the Orthodox Church. Although most Greeks treat their priests in a casual manner which would surprise many Americans, religion plays an important part in the daily lives of the Greeks, who may therefore place great emphasis on removal of the religious barrier between themselves and the U.S.S.R. Finally, the Kremlin, by its strong support of the Yugoslav Partisans and the French National Committee, has indicated that it can be counted upon to encourage groups which oppose restoration of the old order within their countries. Under these conditions, Russia's prospects for good relations with the majority of the Greek people in the post-war period are undoubtedly bright.

**BRITAIN AND THE MEDITERRANEAN.** Like Russia, Britain feels that a friendly post-war régime in Greece is essential to its welfare. This belief rests on the conviction that, despite the advent of cargo

planes, the Suez Canal and ports along the eastern Mediterranean will be extremely important for a long time to come. In setting out to assure the existence of a Greek government that would help safeguard British access to these points, the Foreign Office begins with several factors in its favor. Among these is the huge reservoir of good will built early in the nineteenth century when Britain helped the Greeks secure their independence. During the Battle for Greece in 1941 there were countless examples of friendship between the Greek people and the British armed forces, and this close cooperation has since been maintained by British liaison officers and the Greek guerrillas. Although similar ties between the United States and Greece have been few, American prestige is nonetheless very high and of political consequence.

The popular support which Britain and the United States now enjoy in Greece, however, may be impaired by the attitude adopted by London and Washington. Although Greece must be liberated before it can be discovered what institutions the people want, a "wait and see" policy must be accompanied by assurances that Greece will not be saddled with a government maintained by force. Lacking such assurances, there is not only danger of civil strife in Greece but also the possibility that exclusively pro-Soviet sympathies will be created among the Greek people. These eventualities can be avoided only if the U.S.S.R., Britain and the United States agree that Greece must have a truly representative post-war government.

WINIFRED N. HADSEL

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
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# Washington News Letter



OCT. 25.—The United States has no reason to hope that General Pedro Ramirez' government in Argentina will sever relations with the Axis powers and thereby close the last formal avenue for the entrance of Nazi influence into the Western Hemisphere. The resignation from the Cabinet on October 13 of the three strongest advocates of a diplomatic break permitted government control to fall into the hands of extreme nationalists, who support authoritarianism in domestic affairs and, under the cover of a foreign policy of "friendship for all," advocate maintenance of relations with the Axis.

**EXPLOSIVE POSSIBILITIES.** During the past two weeks, however, the reorganized Cabinet has pursued such a dictatorial policy that the democratic spirit of resistance among the people, highlighted by a "Professors' Manifesto" of October 15, has been greatly strengthened. The elements of an explosive conflict which are present today in Argentina's internal political situation may ultimately force the downfall of the Ramirez government.

The pilots of the extremist Cabinet are Alberto Gilbert, Minister of Foreign Affairs; General Luis C. Perlinger, Minister of the Interior, and Gustavo Martinez Zuviria, Minister of Justice and Public Education. Perlinger and Zuviria, an anti-Semitic nationalist who writes under the name of Hugo West, are new appointees, while Gilbert was Minister of the Interior until recently. The Cabinet officers who resigned are Jorge Santamarina, Minister of Finance; Brigadier General Elbio Anaya, Minister of Justice and Public Education; and Vice Admiral Ismael Galindez, Minister of Public Works. As John W. White reported to the *New York Herald Tribune* from Santiago, Chile, on October 23, the government reorganization is "a signal victory for the pro-Nazi army officers" in Argentina.

While the Ramirez régime headed toward one extreme, public opinion in Argentina moved rapidly in the other direction. The Manifesto, published on October 15 and signed by 153 persons, called on the government to return to constitutional democracy and to fulfill its obligations in the hemisphere solidarity program. Ramirez on October 16 ordered the dismissal of "government employes" whose names were among the signers. These "government employes" included several score faculty members of the state-controlled universities at Buenos Aires, Córdoba, La Plata, and Tucumán.

The Manifesto and the Ramirez order created a

crisis in Argentina. Rector Alfredo Palacios at La Plata University refused to dismiss signers of the Manifesto who were members of his faculty, and Minister of Public Education Zuviria closed the institution. So many professors were dismissed from Buenos Aires University that it was unable to function adequately. Students boycotted its classes and the classes of the other two universities, and on October 23 Zuviria outlawed the students' organization, *Federación Universitaria Argentina*, warning that the "severest measures will be adopted" in case of disorder at the universities.

**TWO ANTI-SEMITIC MOVES.** The disturbance has inspired the workers, and the United Press correspondent in Montevideo received reliable reports that "a general labor strike threatened as a protest against the attitude of the Ramirez government." The government has displayed its authoritarian tendencies by attacking religious freedom as well as freedom of thought. On October 23 the Interventor in Entre Rios province suppressed Jewish and Masonic welfare and mutual aid societies by withdrawing their corporate charters. This measure is particularly interesting because the Interventor of Entre Rios is Col. Ernesto Ramirez, the President's brother. Earlier in October the Ramirez government ordered that Yiddish language newspapers print editorials in Spanish as well as Yiddish. Lack of facilities for printing in Spanish forced the temporary suspension of the Yiddish papers and on October 15 brought this rebuke to Argentina from President Roosevelt:

"I cannot forbear to give expression to my own feeling of apprehension at the taking in this hemisphere of action obviously anti-Semitic in nature and of a character so closely identified with the most repugnant features of Nazi doctrine."

A number of American Republics have pressed Argentina to abandon its strict neutrality, but, to no avail. The Foreign Offices of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Guatemala cabled Buenos Aires on Columbus Day suggesting that General Ramirez' government break with the Axis. The Chilean Biological Society and a group of thirty-six medical professors in Chile sent communications to two of the Manifesto signers severely condemning the policy of the government that dismissed them. The State Department announced on October 23 that seventy-nine firms in Argentina had been added to the black list—the catalog of business houses and individuals suspected of trading with enemies of the United States.

BLAIR BOLLES

1918—TWENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE F.P.A.—1943